Many decision situations involve two or more of the following divergences from subjective expected utility: imprecision of beliefs (or ambiguity), imprecision of tastes (or multi-utility), and state dependence of utility. This paper proposes and characterises a model of uncertainty averse preferences that can simultaneously incorporate all three phenomena. The representation supports a principled separation of (imprecise) beliefs and (potentially state-dependent, imprecise) tastes. Moreover, the representation permits comparative statics separating the roles of beliefs and tastes, and is modular: it easily delivers special cases involving various combinations of the phenomena, as well as state-dependent multi-utility generalisations covering popular ambiguity models.
Introduction
Decision makers sometimes do not know precisely the probabilities of the relevant outcomes given their actions; they may thus exhibit aversion to this uncertainty or 'imprecision in beliefs' (Ellsberg, 1961) .
1 They sometimes may have trouble comparing the relevant outcomes; this imprecision in tastes has long been studied in economics (Aumann, 1962; Dubra et al., 2004) and has been connected to Allais-style violations of subjective expected utility (Levi, 1986; Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015) . They sometimes have state-dependent utility (Arrow, 1974; Karni, 1983b) . And sometimes, they may exhibit all three of these effects in a single decision situation. For instance, although classic analyses of health insurance-which are essentially monetary bets on one's future state of health-focus uniquely on state-dependent utilities (Cook and Graham, 1977) , in many cases individuals have limited information about the probabilities of future health states-or imprecise beliefs-and, given the lack of familiarity with some of the states, may have trouble evaluating their utility in them-or have imprecise tastes. Or, to take another example, whilst some have proposed explanations of the equity premium puzzle in terms of belief imprecision and uncertainty aversion (e.g. Ju and Miao, 2012) , others have claimed to explain it using state-dependent utility (e.g. Melino and Yang, 2003) .
Applications typically focus on (at most) one of these factors, ignoring the others. However, their simultaneous presence poses the question of the robustness of the conclusions drawn from single-factor analyses to the presence of other factors. Moreover, establishing a potential role for several factors in explaining a given phenomenon naturally leads to the question of their relative importance: is, say, state-dependence or belief imprecision a bigger driver of a given asset pricing pattern? And if different factors impact an economic variable in diverse ways, how do they trade off? Systematic study of such questions would naturally be grounded in a formal model accommodating all of these phenomena. The present paper provides such a model.
From a decision-theoretic perspective, these effects correspond to distinct violations of the standard axioms of subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954) , 2 so the required model 1 The term 'imprecise probabilities' is widely used in statistics and philosophy; see for example Walley (1991) ; Bradley (2014) and the references therein. 2 More precisely, in the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework and in the context of complete preferences: violations of the Independence axiom for imprecision of beliefs, of the restriction of Independence to should be able handle all of them simultaneously, whilst ideally preserving the separation of beliefs and tastes. Such a model is still lacking in the theoretical literature, which almost exclusively focusses on these violations taken in isolation: work on ambiguity, for example, generally assumes precise tastes and state-independent utility, and that on state-dependent utility mainly works in the context of precise beliefs and tastes. In fact, simultaneous violations pose specific technical and conceptual challenges. Technically, the bulk of the literature on state-dependent utility relies strongly on the expected utility framework (Karni et al., 1983; Karni, 1993a) , whereas many of the principal axioms in the ambiguity literature explicitly use constant acts (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Maccheroni et al., 2006) , which lose their meaning as soon as utilities are state dependent. Conceptually, it is unclear what functional form to use when modelling situations with imprecise tastes, imprecise beliefs and state-dependent utility. We are aware of no proposed model accommodating all three phenomena under uncertainty aversion; the closest related literature, on incomplete preferences (Galaabaatar and Karni, 2013) , suggests a functional form that violates one of the central axioms we defend below (Section 4.1).
We propose and axiomatise the following state-dependent non-expected utility representation:
where C is a (closed convex) set of probability measures over states and υ is a function assigning to each state s a (closed convex) set of utility functions over consequences. This representation can accommodate all the aforementioned phenomena. Indeed, it displays:
(i) imprecise beliefs, in the use of multiple priors C; (ii) imprecise tastes, in the multiple utility functions υpsq; and (iii) state dependence of utility, in the possible dependence of the set of utility functions used to evaluate consequences on the state.
On the axiomatic front, given the absence of expected utility both over states and consequences, no form of the Independence axiom appears in our most general result. In its stead is an uncertainty aversion condition that retains the same spirit as, though strengthens the classic Uncertainty Aversion axiom due to Schmeidler (1989) . Similarly, given the state dependence of utility, there is no Monotonicity axiom, but instead State Consistency, which basically says that one's preferences regarding the consequence obtained in a given state is risky prospects for imprecision of tastes, and of the Monotonicity axiom for state dependence of utility.
independent of what one would get in the other states. This is a minimal axiom ensuring a coherent notion of preferences conditional on a state; our results suggest moreover that it is a basic axiom for state-dependent utility in the context of imprecise beliefs or tastes.
Whilst our benchmark model can accommodate all of the aforementioned violations of subjective expected utility, it provides a springboard for the study of models incorporating only some violations. As an illustration, we axiomatise special cases in which each of the factors is 'shut down'. Moreover, we provide a simple extension, permitting an extremely general treatment of uncertainty that covers virtually all existing uncertainty averse models in the literature. As such, our approach straightforwardly yields state-dependent multiutility generalisations of standard ambiguity models, beyond the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) multiple prior representation used in (1) above.
To corroborate the interpretations of the different elements of the model, we provide comparative statics separating their impacts on choice. In particular, our model clearly separates the impact of belief imprecision from taste imprecision and state-dependence. It thus can smoothly incorporate changes in or 'addition' of different factors in a given economic application, hence lending itself naturally to the study of the previously mentioned robustness or relative importance questions.
The paper is organised as follows. The framework is set out in Section 2. The benchmark model is stated and characterised in Section 3. Section 4 maps out special cases and extensions, and clarifies the relationship to the existing literature on the various violations, whilst Section 5 provides a comparative statics analysis. Proofs and technical material are contained in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
We use a version of the standard Anscombe-Aumann (1963) framework. Let S be a finite set of states; ∆ is the set of probability measures over S. Let X be the set of consequences.
An act is a function from states to consequences; A X S is the set of acts. For state s and acts f and g, the act f s g is defined as follows: f s gpsq f psq and f s gptq gptq for all t $ s. With slight abuse of notation, a constant act taking consequence x in every state will be denoted x and the set of constant acts will be denoted X.
We assume that X is the set of lotteries (Borel probability measures) over a compact metric space of prizes Z, with the topology of weak convergence. Special cases of this setup include the set of (standard) lotteries over a closed interval of monetary prizes, or over a finite set of prizes. Our results also hold for X any compact polyhedral convex subset of a finite-dimensional vector space, 3 so they apply in cases where consequences are commodity bundles or allocations (e.g. as in social choice under uncertainty) taking values in bounded intervals. X admits the standard mixing operation. Moreover, A is also a compact convex subset of a vector space with the inherited mixture relation, defined pointwise as standard. For f, h A and α r0, 1s, we write f α h for the mixture of f and h; similarly, we write x α y for the mixture of x, y X. A is endowed with the product topology. For h, h I A, A h,h I tf A : ds S, hβ r0, 1s s.t. f psq hpsq β h I psqu. The binary relation © on A depicts the decision maker's preferences over acts. The symmetric and asymmetric parts of ©, and ¡, are defined in the standard way. A state s S is said to be null if f s h h for all f, h A; otherwise it is non-null. A functional
A utility function is a continuous function u : Z Ñ . We endow U, the set of utility functions, with the supnorm. With slight abuse of notation, for any x X and u U, we set upxq ³ udx. A set of utility functions U U is non-trivial if, for every constant function u I U, there exists x X and a non-constant u U with upxq u I pxq. For any c, c I X, U U is c, c I -precise if there exists u U such that upc I q inf u I U u I pc I q ¤ inf u I U u I pdq ¤ inf u I U u I pcq upcq for all d X. We define the following order on sets of utility functions: U Finally, a closed convex set of priors C ∆ is null-consistent if, for every p, q C, and every s S, ppsq 0 if and only if qpsq 0.
Benchmark model

Axioms
First consider the following three Basic Axioms on preferences, which are standard for our consequence space.
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Axiom A1 (Weak Order). © is complete and transitive. Axiom A2 (Non-degeneracy). There exists f, g A such that f ¡ g. Axiom A3 (Continuity). For all f A, the sets tg A| f¨gu and tg A| f © gu are closed.
Each of the following axioms has been used in standard treatments to impose state independence of utility.
Axiom A4 (Monotonicity). For all f, g A, if f psq © gpsq for all s S, then f © g. Axiom A5 (State Independence). For all h, h I A, x, y X and non-null s, t S, x s h © y s h if and only if x t h I © y t h I .
In the presence of the standard Independence axiom 6 (and Weak Order), these two axioms are equivalent; this is no longer the case in the context of imprecise beliefs and tastes (Section 4.1). Since the aim is to go beyond state-independent utility, neither of them will be imposed here. In their place, consider the following axiom. In many cases where our framework typically applies, it is fairly straightforward to identify ©-best-and-worst h, h. For instance, if X is the set of lotteries over a closed interval (or finite set) of monetary prizes, in most cases (e.g. under first-order stochastic dominance), h (respectively h) can be taken to be lottery yielding the top (resp. bottom) prize for sure. Or, if X is a set of commodity bundles or allocations, in most cases (e.g.
under monotonicity or Pareto), h can be taken to be the bundle or allocation yielding the maximal amount for each commodity or individual, and similarly for h.
In the absence of Monotonicity or State Independence, constant acts-acts taking the same consequence in every state-cease to have any special status. This poses a significant challenge, given their central role both as concerns state independence of utility and uncertainty aversion. For the former, they are the acts having the same utility in all states, and hence are key to 'tying' together the utilities assigned to consequences in different states. For the latter, they constitute the 'safe options', of sure precise value, that play a role in the axiomatisations of many popular ambiguity models (Schmeidler, 1989; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004; Maccheroni et al., 2006) , as well as in the definition of notions such as relative ambiguity aversion (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002) .
In the face of this challenge, we mobilise an insight from the literature on state-dependent utility (Drèze, 1987; Karni, 1993a,b; Hill, 2009 ), namely to use essentially constant acts:
acts that, though they yield different consequences in different states, yield the same precise utility in all states. In our model, the set of mixtures of ©-best-and-worst acts h, h (ie. th α h : α r0, 1su) will be a set of essentially constant acts; this comes out in the formulation of the uncertainty aversion axiom.
Recall firstly the classic uncertainty aversion axiom from Schmeidler (1989) .
Axiom A7 (Uncertainty Aversion). For all f, g A and α r0, 1s, if f g then f α g © g. Now consider, for any h, h A, the following axiom. Axiom A8 (Strong Uncertainty Aversion with respect to h, h). For all f, g A and α, β, β I r0, 1s, if f © h β h and g © h β I h then f α g © ph β hq α ph β I hq.
The only instance of this axiom used here will involve ©-best-and-worst acts h, h; in this case, it is a strengthening of Uncertainty Aversion. To understand it, consider first the case where consequences are lotteries over monetary prizes, preferences over lotteries are represented by a single state-independent utility function, and h, h are best and worst prizes respectively. It then implies 7 that if the decision maker values the act f at over $x, and the act g at over $y, then he prefers the 50-50 mixture of the two acts, f1 Strong Uncertainty Aversion with respect to ©-best-and-worst h, h is the formulation of precisely this condition when nothing can be assumed about the precision, form and state independence of utility. In this context, mixtures h β h are a proxy for 'sure' acts-monetary payments in the previous example. The axiom, when formulated for ©-best-and-worst acts, says that this hedging motive holds on this 'scale' of essentially constant acts. Since, as remarked previously, it is fairly straightforward in many cases to identify ©-best-and-worst acts, Strong Uncertainty Aversion with respect to such acts is in practice as easy to test as other typical decision-theory axioms.
Finally consider, for any h, h A, the following axiom. Axiom A9 (EC-Independence with respect to h, h). For all f, g A h,h and α r0, 1s, β p0, 1q, f © g if and only if f β ph α hq © g β ph α hq. This is Gilboa and Schmeidler's C-Independence, 8 but formulated in terms of mixtures of h, h and acts yielding such mixtures as consequences. As noted, in the context of state dependence and imprecision of tastes, constant acts lose their special status; so C-independence no longer has its original sense. By contrast, mixtures of ©-best-andworst h, h are essentially constant-they yield the same precise utility in all states. So, in using these in the place of constant acts, EC-Independence (for Essentially ConstantIndependence) with respect to ©-best-and-worst h, h retains the essence of the original axiom even in our more general setting.
Representation Theorem
The previously discussed axioms yield the following representation.
Theorem 1. Let © be a preference relation on A, and h, h A. The following are equivalent:
(i) © satisfies the Basic Axioms, State Consistency, Strong Uncertainty Aversion and EC-Independence with respect to h, h, and h, h are ©-best-and-worst acts (ii) there exists a non-trivial, closed, convex, h, h-constant, h, h-precise function υ :
zr and a null-consistent, closed, convex set of priors C ∆ such that © is represented by a continuous V : A Ñ R with:
Note that, by Proposition 1, the first two axioms in part (i) imply the existence of ©-best-and-worst acts, so the final clause of (i) really only identifies h, h as two such acts. So the second half of part (i) just says that Strong Uncertainty Aversion and EC-Independence hold with respect to ©-best-and-worst acts h, h A; we use this shorter formulation below.
Theorem 1 tells us that the axioms yield a general state-dependent utility representation, incorporating imprecision of both beliefs and tastes. On the one hand, tastes for consequences are represented by a function υ assigning a set of utility functions to each state.
To the extent that sets of utilities are involved, this captures imprecision of tastes; to the extent that the set may depend on the state, state-dependence is also accommodated. The non-triviality, closure and convexity of υ are familiar in the literature. The other properties translate the (double) role of h, h-mixtures as essentially constant acts: h, h-constancy says that they receive the same evaluation in all states, and h, h-precision ensures that they can be seen as 'sure options', insofar as hedging among them provides no particular advantage. 9 Since the set of utilities depends on the state, we call the non-trivial, closed, convex, h, h-constant, h, h-precise function υ a h, h-state-dependent multi-utility, or simply a statedependent multi-utility when h, h is clear from the context.
On the belief side, the representation involves a set of priors C; as such, it is a straightforward extension of the maxmin EU model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) to incorporate state-dependence of utility and imprecision of tastes. Closure and convexity of C are standard; null-consistency is a non-nullness condition, guaranteeing that if a state is non-null according to one probability measure in C, then it is non-null according to all of them.
Mimicking the terminology used for utilities, we refer to C as a multi-prior.
Uniqueness
To discuss the uniqueness of the representation, we require some terminology. A statedependent multi-utility υ representing © in tandem with multi-prior C according to (1) is said to be tight if there exists no state-dependent multi-utility υ I representing © in tandem with C according to (1) such that υ I psq υpsq for all s S, with strict containment for some s. A tight state-dependent multi-utility is as small as a representation can be, in the sense that there are no extraneous members of the relevant sets.
Proposition 2. Let © satisfy the Basic Axioms, State Consistency, Strong Uncertainty Aversion and EC-Independence with respect to ©-best-and-worst h, h A. Then there exists a tight υ and C representing © according to (1). Moreover, C is unique and υ is unique up to positive affine transformation.
A central challenge in the state-dependent utility literature (under expected utility) is to provide a suitably unique representation, separating in particular the (state-dependent) utility part from the belief side. This result shows that our representation has the desired uniqueness: the state-dependent multi-utility is unique up to positive affine transformation, and the multi-prior is unique.
9 h, h-precision implies that the restriction of V to the set of h, h-mixtures is affine.
Special cases and Extensions
The three phenomena-state-dependence of utility, imprecision of tastes and imprecision of beliefs-can be straightforwardly separated in representation (1); indeed, any combination of them can be 'shut down', yielding potentially useful special cases. Moreover, the treatment of uncertainty can be extended beyond the multi-prior approach adopted in representation (1). The relevant special cases and extensions are summarized in Table 1 , which involves the following two axioms.
Axiom A10 (State-wise Independence). For every x, y, z X, h A, α p0, 1q and s S, x s h © y s h if and only if px α zq s h © py α zq s h.
Axiom A11 (Restricted Independence with respect to h, h). For all f, g, h A
h,h and
The table is to be read in the context of the following result.
Proposition 3. Let © be a preference relation on A. Then, for each row of Table 1 , the following are equivalent:
(i) © satisfies the axioms in Theorem 1 augmented by (for the 1st three rows) or with the exception of (last row) the axiom in second column of Table 1 (ii) there exists a pair as stated in the third column of Table 1 such that © is represented by a continuous V : A Ñ R as specified in that column.
Moreover, any combination of the axiom additions or removals in the second column of Table 1 characterises the corresponding combination of the representations in the third column.
Finally, in each case, the uniqueness of the representation is the specification or natural generalisation of that in Proposition 2.
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We now discuss these characterisations in turn. 10 More precisely: C and p are unique, tight U, u and υ are unique up to positive affine transformation, and tight α is unique up to the corresponding transformation (see Theorem 2 in Appendix A for details). ; closed if, whenever pa n , b n q αpp n q with p n Ñ p and pa n , b n q Ñ pa, bq ¡0 ¢ , then pa, bq αppq; grounded if there exists p ∆ such that p1, 0q αppq; calibrated (with respect to υ) if, for all p ∆, pa, bq αppq and z υpXq, az b ¥ z; null-consistent (with respect to υ) if, for every p, q such that αppq, αpqq $ r, ppsq 0 and qpsq $ 0 for some s S if and only if, for each r pintpυpXS , there exists p I ∆ and pa I , b I q αpp I q such that a I°s S p I psqr s b I a°s S ppsqr s b for all pa, bq αppq. We adopt the convention that, when αppq is empty, p is not involved in the minimisation.
'Shutting down' factors
The first row of Table 1 gives a general state-independent representation with imprecise beliefs and tastes. The set of utilities U is state-independent; hence the state-dependence of utility is 'shut down' by adding the standard Monotonicity axiom (Section 3.1).
12 The same representation is obtained by replacing State Consistency with the State Independence axiom (see Proposition 7 in Appendix A). In particular, unlike in the expected utility case, these two axioms are not equivalent in the presence of imprecise beliefs and tastes. The maxmin multi-utility representation over consequences in (2) is similar to that obtained by Maccheroni (2002) in the context of decision under risk, though his characterisation uses a weakened version of the Independence axiom in the place of Strong Uncertainty Aversion.
The second row involves what, to our knowledge, is the first precise state-dependent utility uncertainty averse representation. The function u is a standard (precise) statedependent utility function as in the state-dependent utility literature; its uniqueness is comparable to that obtained in this literature (Karni, 1993a (Karni, ,b, 2011 . 13 Hence taste imprecision is 'shut down' by the addition of a weakened independence axiom, applying only to preferences conditional on states.
The third row provides a state-dependent multi-utility representation with a single-prior belief. Hence, imprecision in beliefs (and thus uncertainty aversion) is 'shut down' by the restriction of the standard independence axiom to acts yielding mixtures of ©-best-andworst h, h as consequences in every state (i.e. acts in A h,h ; see Section 2).
The second clause of Proposition 3 implies that concurrent shut downs of several factors are obtained by combining the axioms in the table, yielding representations that can be read off from those provided. For instance, the combination of the axioms for the first and third rows characterises a single prior and state-independent multi-utility representation. (Riella, 2015, Thms 5 & 6) proposes a representation for precisely this case; though, unlike the representations involved here, it uses the certainty equivalents of consequences rather than 12 The fact that Monotonicity yields the expected effects-namely state-independence of the multiutility-is a non-trivial property of the representation. For instance, the representation V pfq min pC min uU°s S ppsqupf psqq, which is the uncertainty averse counterpart of the incomplete preference imprecise belief and taste model due to Galaabaatar and Karni (2013) , is basically incompatible with Monotonicity (Hill, 2017) . In fact, that representation violates State Consistency. 13 Other approaches (Karni et al., 1983; Schmeidler, 2016, 1993; Karni and Mongin, 2000) yield a weaker uniqueness: up to cardinal unit comparable transformation (Karni et al., 1983) .
their utility values, in the style of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) .
Extensions
The final row of Table 1 shows that dropping EC-Independence yields a representation with a more general treatment of uncertainty. It encompasses many of the main theories of uncertainty averse preferences proposed in the literature. One way to see this is to compare such models, which generally assume precise state-independent utility, with the corresponding special case of (5). By Proposition 3, removing EC-Independence and adding
Monotonicity and State-wise Independence yields this case:
where u is a precise state-independent utility, and α is as in the final row of Table 1 .
This representation clearly contains not only maxmin EU preferences, but also other families such as variational preferences (Maccheroni et al., 2006) and confidence prefer- Note that further extensions of (5) can be obtained by weakening Strong Uncertainty Aversion to standard Uncertainty Aversion (and adding some technical assumptions); in 14 Precisely: variational preferences correspond to the case where a 1 for all p ∆ and pa, bq αppq, confidence preferences to the case where uphpsqq 0 and b 0 for all p ∆ and pa, bq αppq, and maxmin EU to the case a 1 and b 0 for all p ∆ and pa, bq αppq.
15 A functional I is concavifiable if there exists a strictly monotone transformation of it which is concave. For instance, the smooth ambiguity functional under uncertainty aversion-often presented as Ipϕq
ϕdp¨du¨for concave, strictly increasing φ-is concavifiable because φ ¥ I is concave. doing so, however, the simple multi-utility representation of tastes in (1) and (5) 
Definition 2 does not assume that the decision makers are using the same best and worst acts and hence it does not assume that the decision makers share the same essentially constant acts. For a given imprecision aversion comparison, this makes it difficult to disentangle aspects pertaining to the decision makers' tastes from those concerning their beliefs:
what is a comparison of essentially constant acts for one decision maker-and hence one involving only tastes-may not be for the other. Indeed, to conduct comparative statics in the context of state-dependent utility, it is not uncommon to invoke some assumption of comparability between the decision makers' preferences (Karni, 1979 (Karni, , 1983a Drèze and Rustichini, 2004) . For our main result, we only require the mild assumption that the less imprecision-averse decision maker's best act h 2 is considered a maximal act by the more imprecision-averse decision maker. 
These notions are as to be expected. Imprecision aversion on consequences compares consequences with the 'essentially constant' mixtures of best and worst acts on each nonnull state, but eschews comparisons of acts differing on several states. Imprecision aversion on states considers only acts f yielding 'essentially constant' consequences, and asks that if f is preferred to an essentially constant act by decision maker 1, then 2 retains the same preference. A complication with the latter condition is that the decision makers may have different essentially constant acts: because of this, it uses the 'equivalent' act to f but formulated in terms of decision maker 2's essentially constant acts (f ). © 1 is more uncertainty averse than © 2 if and only the latter's representing multi-prior is contained in the former's and the decision makers share the same (normalised) utilities.
Hence the essential change in the notion of relative uncertainty aversion required under taste imprecision and state dependence of utility is the switch from standard constant acts to essentially constant ones (mixtures of h, h). Interestingly, imprecision aversion on states separates out the containment of multi-priors from the identity of (normalised) utilities, only implying the former (Proposition 5 (ii)).
Similarly, in the presence of state-independent utility, the notion of imprecision aversion on consequences can be reformulated with preferences over constant acts in the place of preferences conditional on states. It is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 5 (i) that, in this case, © 1 is more imprecision averse on consequences than © 2 if and only if there is the appropriate ordering of the representing multi-utilities in (2):
this is, to our knowledge, the first comparative static result for the maxmin multi-utility representation featuring in (1), it echoes results obtained for other multi-utility-style representations in the case of monetary lotteries (e.g. Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015) . It also corroborates the interpretation of υ as state-dependent multi-utility.
In summary, the proposed model permits comparative statics, relating a state-dependentutility extension of standard relative uncertainty aversion to concordant changes in the two primitives of model-the multi-prior and the state-dependent multi-utility. Moreover, the changes in the two primitives can be separately characterised, in terms of more refined imprecision aversions on consequences and on states. 16 This attests to the possibility of separately studying changes in the belief-and taste-factors under this model. Importantly, it allows a grasp on cases where beliefs and tastes do not move in the same direction. Consider a hurricane in a region that has never known natural disasters. Given the novelty of the experience, the inhabitants' tastes concerning the consequences of a hurricane would typically become more precise after the event. Moreover, since it may be unclear whether it was a one-off or a new trend, their ex ante (quasi-)certainty of the absence of hurricanes would naturally give way to a wider range of probabilities of future hurricanes ex postbetraying an increase in belief imprecision. In such cases, tastes and beliefs may move in opposite directions. Whereas the general notion of imprecision aversion does not apply, the more refined notions provide the foundations for the study of such changes. By allowing clearly understood and separate interventions on the belief and taste parameters, representation (1) provides the modeling tools required to investigate the consequences of such simultaneous yet diametric movements on, say, insurance purchasing.
16 Indeed, Propositions 4 and 5 show that the general notion of imprecision aversion can be 'factorised'
into the conjunction of more refined imprecision aversions on consequences and on states.
Appendix A Proofs
Throughout the Appendices, ¤ on R n is the standard order, given by a ¤ b iff a i ¤ b i for all 1 ¤ i ¤ n, for all a, b R n . Note that X is a closed convex subset of the Banach space capZq of signed Borel measures of bounded variation over Z, under the total variation norm (denoted here }¤}). Moreover, since Z is compact, capZq (under the total variation norm) is isometrically isomorphic to the topological dual of U (which, recall, is the set of continuous real functions on Z), under the duality f, x ¡ ³ udx. This duality generates the weak ¦ topology on capZq; unless specified, we adopt this topology throughout the Appendix. ¤ is the standard scalar product of vectors in finite-dimensional vector spaces, and the duality for pU, capZqq (in particular, u ¤ x ³ udx for x X, u U).
A.1 General result
We begin with a preparatory proposition.
Proposition 6. For every non-null s S, the relation © s defined by, for all x, y X, x © s y if and only if x s h © y s h for some h A is a continuous weak order.
Proof. For all x, y X, if x « s y, then there exists no h A with x s h « y s h, so x s h y s h for all h A, so x¨s y. Hence © s is complete. Moreover, for all x, y, z X if x © s y and y © s z, then for some h, h I A x s h © y s h and y s h I © z s h I . It follows by A6 that y s h © z s h, so x s h © z s h by A1 and hence x © s z; so © s is transitive. Finally, for any y X, tx A : x © s yu tx A : hh A, x s h © y s hu tx A : x s h © y s h, dh Au hA tx A : x s h © y s hu (where the middle equality is due to A6), which is closed since, by A3, each of the sets tx A : x s h © y s hu is. A similar argument holds for tx X : x¨s yu, so © s is continuous.
The following is the fundamental technical result, which underpins the others. A pair pυ, αq representing © according to (5) below is tight if there exists no pυ I , α I q representing © according to (5) such that υ I psq υpsq and α I ppq αppq for all s S and p ∆, with strict containment for some s or p. Moreover, for any other tight pair pυ I , α I q representing © according to (5), there exists κ ¡0 and λ such that υ I psq κυpsq λ for all non-null s S, and α I ppq tpa, κb λp1 ¡ aqq | dpa, bq αppqu for all p ∆.
We shall refer to a function α : ∆ Ñ 2 ¡0 ¢ with the properties specified in this Theorem as an ambiguity index.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider firstly the (i) implies (ii) direction.
By State Consistency and the fact that h, h are ©-best-and-worst, hpsq ¡ s hpsq α hpsq for all α p0, 1q, whence it follows from A1 and A6 that h ¡ h α h for all α p0, 1q. We now show the following stochastic dominance property for h, h: for every α, β r0, 1s,
ph β hq. Since h β h © h β h and h © h β h, it follows from A8 that h α h © h β h, as required. For the other direction, suppose for reductio that there exist α, β r0, 1s with α β, and h α h © h β h. It follows from the previous argument that h α h h β h. Without loss of generality, we can assume that rα, βs is a maximal interval with this property, in the following sense: for every α I α and every β I ¡ β, h α I h h α h h β h h β I h. Since h α I h h for all α I p0, 1q, β 1. Take any γ 0, β¡α 1¡α¨( this set is non-empty since β ¡ α). So h γ ph α hq h δ h for some α δ β. By the previous result, h δ h h α h h β h. However, since h β h¨h α h, it follows from A8 that h γ βp1¡γq h h γ ph β hq¨h γ ph α hq h δ h h β h, whence, by the previous result h γ βp1¡γq h h β h, contradicting the maximality of rα, βs. So h α h h β h whenever α β, as required.
Relying on this result, we apply standard arguments to obtain a real-valued functional representing ©. It follows from the fact that h, h are ©-best-and-worst, A1 and A6 that h © f © h for all f A. It follows from this observation, the previous one and A3 that, for each f A, there exists a unique α f r0, 1s with f h α f h. Define V : A Ñ r0, 1s by V pfq α f for each f A. By definition and A1, V represents ©. By A2, V is nonconstant. It follows from A8 that, for all f, g A, α r0, 1s, V pf α gq ¥ αV pfq p1 ¡ αqV pgq. So V is concave. By A3, V is continuous. Now fix a non-null s S. We proceed as above, but now for © s . We first show that for every α, β r0, 1s, α ¥ β iff hpsq α hpsq © s hpsq β hpsq. If α ¥ β, then h α h h α¡β 1¡β ph β hq. Since h β h © h β h and h s ph β hq © h β h, it follows from A8 for h, h that ph α hq s ph β hq © h β h, so, by A6, hpsq α hpsq © s hpsq β hpsq as required. For the other direction, suppose for reductio that there exist α, β r0, 1s with α β, and hpsq α hpsq © s hpsq β hpsq. It follows from the previous argument that hpsq α hpsq s hpsq β hpsq. Without loss of generality, we can assume that rα, βs is a maximal interval with this property, in the same sense as above. By State Consistency and the fact that h, h are ©-best-and-worst, hpsq α I hpsq s hpsq for all α I p0, 1q, so β 1. Take any γ 0, β¡α 1¡α¨( this set is non-empty since β ¡ α). So hpsq γ phpsq α hpsqq hpsq δ hpsq for some α δ β. By the previous result, hpsq δ hpsq s hpsq α hpsq s hpsq β hpsq. However, since, by A6, h β h¨ph α hq s ph β hq, it follows from A8 that h γ βp1¡γq h h γ ph β hq¨h γ pph α hq s ph β hqq ph δ hq s ph γ βp1¡γq hq ph β hq s ph γ βp1¡γq hq, whence, by the previous result h γ βp1¡γq h s h β h, contradicting the maximality of rα, βs. So hpsq α hpsq s hpsq β hpsq whenever α β, as required.
By this observation, Proposition 6 and the fact that h, h are ©-best-and-worst, for every x X, there is a unique α h for all γ r0, 1s, so V s px γ yq ¥ γV s pxq p1 ¡ γqV s pyq and V s is concave. By Proposition 6, V s is (weak ¦ -)continuous.
We have the following consequence.
Lemma A.1. For each non-null s S, there exists a non-trivial hpsq, hpsq-precise closed convex set of utility functions U s such that V s pxq min uUs u ¤ x for all x X. Moreover there exists such a set which is such that every other non-trivial hpsq, hpsq-precise closed convex set of utility functions with these properties is a superset.
Proof. Fix a non-null s S. Let 1 : Z Ñ R be the constant function yielding value 1. We first extend V s to the set of non-negative measures ca pZq capZq:V s : capZq Ñ is defined byV s pµq p1 ¤ µqV s p µ 1¤µ q. For µ, ν ca pZq and λ r0, 1s, we have:
where the inequality follows from the concavity of V s . HenceV s is concave. Since V s is weak ¦ -continuous (and the duality is weak ¦ -continuous), it follows thatV s is weak ¦ -continuous. It follows thatV s is superdifferentiable at every µ intpca pZqq (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Thm 7 .12)-that is, for each such µ, there exists u U with u ¤ ν V s pµq ¡ u ¤ µ ¥V s pνq for all ν ca pZq. Note that if this holds for u U at µ ca pZq with µ $ 0, then we have, for u I U defined by u I pzq upzq V s pµq ¡ u ¤ µ for all z Z, that u I ¤ ν ¥V s pνq for all ν ca pZq and u I ¤ µ V s pµq. With slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to u I satisfying these conditions for µ ca pZq with µ $ 0 as a subgradient at µ. It follows from the definition ofV s that u is a subgradient of µ X if and only if it is a subgradient of λµ, for all λ ¡ 0.
X is weak ¦ -compact because Z is compact (Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Thm 15.11) , and since it linearly spans capZq, capZq is weakly compactly generated in the sense of Phelps (1993, Defn 2.41). SinceV s is weak ¦ -continuous (and the norm topology is stronger than the weak ¦ -topology), it is norm-continuous. It follows from Phelps (1993, Thm 2.45) that the set of points in intpca pZqq whereV s is Gâteaux differentiable-and hence at which it has unique supergradients-is dense in intpca pZqq. Let U s be convex closure of the union of the subgradients at all µ intpca pZqq whereV s is Gâteaux differentiable.
It follows from the upper hemi-continuity of the superdifferential mapping (Phelps, 1993, Prop 2.5), that, for each point in intpca pZqq, some supergradient at this point is contained in U s . It follows thatV s pµq min uUs u ¤ µ for all µ intpca pZqq, and, by the continuity ofV s , this holds for all µ ca pZq. By construction U s is closed and convex, and we have that V s pxq min uUs u ¤ x for all x X. Since V s is not a constant function, U s is non-trivial. Since, by construction, V s is linear on th α h | α r0, 1su, there exists u U s supporting V s at every point in th α h | α r0, 1su; it follows from this, and the fact that h, h are ©-best-and-worst that U s is hpsq, hpsq-precise. Finally, any other U I s representing V s as stated must contain supergradients at points whereV s is Gâteaux differentiable, and hence be a superset of U s , as required.
Take any non-null s S, and for all null s I S, define V s I V s and U s I U s . By construction, V s phpsq α hpsqq α V s Iphps I q α hps Ifor every α r0, 1s and s, s I S, so υ : S Ñ 2 U zr defined by υpsq U s for all s S, is h, h-constant. Moreover, by Lemma A.1, it is non-trivial, closed, convex and h, h-precise.
Let B r0, 1s S . For every f A, defineV pfq B byV pfqpsq V s pfpsqq for all s S. By A1 and A6, for every f, g A, if f psq s gpsq for every s S, then f g, so the functional I : B Ñ defined by Ipaq V pfq for any f such thatV pfq a is well-defined. By definition V pfq IpV pfqq. Lemma A.2. I is concave, continuous, monotonic, and normalised (ie. for all z r0, 1s, Ipz ¦ q z, where z ¦ is the constant function in B taking value z). Moreover, for every z, w r0, 1s with z $ w, a B and s S, Ipz s aq Ipw s aq if and only if s S is null. q γIpaq p1 ¡ γqIpbq, so I is concave. As concerns the final property, if s S is null, then V px s f q V py s f q for all x, y X, f A by definition, and the corresponding property for I follows immediately. If s S is non-null, then, since, as shown above hpsq α hpsq & s hpsq β hpsq for α $ β, it follows from A6 that V pphpsq α hpss f q $ V pphpsq β hpsqq s f q for all f A; the corresponding property for I follows immediately.
Since B is closed, bounded and convex and I is concave, for each a ripBq, there exists an affine functional φ : S Ñ supporting I at a: i.e. such that φpbq ¥ Ipbq for all b B and φpaq Ipaq. Each such φ can be written as φpbq η ¤ b µ for some η S , µ . We first show that η s ¥ 0 for every s S. Take q η ¤ a ¡s µ φpaq ¡ η s . , it follows from the fact that φ supports I at a that η s ¤ 0, and thus, in the light of the previous result, that η s 0, as required.
Let Φ cl pconvtpη, µq | ha ripBq s.t. φpbq η ¤ b µ supports I at auq. By the continuity of the superdifferential mapping and of I, Ipaq min pη,µqΦ η ¤ a µ for all a B. Since I is differentiable on a dense subset of B and supergradients at differentiable points determine the supergradients elsewhere (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 25.6 ), this does not hold for any proper closed convex subset of Φ. Moreover, since I is normalised, for all µ I 1, p0, µ I q Φ. (It is clear from the construction that p0, µ I q Φ for all µ I ¡ 1.) Hence, for every pη, µq Φztp0, 1qu, there is a unique p ∆ S andā ¡0 such that η ā.p. Let P tpp,ā,bq ∆ ¢ ¡0 ¢ | pā.p,bq Φztp0, 1quu.
By the previous observations, for all a B, Ipaq ¤ min pp,ā,bqP pā.pq ¤ a b with equality whenever a I ¡1 p1q. Since I is normalised, it follows thatār b ¥ r for all pp,ā,bq P and r r0, 1s. We now show that there exists p ∆ such that pp, 1, 0q P. To establish this, note firstly that for every r ¡ 0, there exists no pp, a, bq P such that a ¡ 1 and a.r b r: if there were such a, b, then for any r I r0, 1s with r I r, a.r I b r ¡ a.pr ¡ r I q r I , contradicting the fact that P represents I and that I is normalised. Similarly, for every r 1, there exists no pp, a, bq P such that a 1 and a.r b r. Since I is normalised, it follows from the previous observation about the representation of I by P that there exists p ∆ with pp, 1, 0q P. Since, for any p ∆ and a B, p ¤a ¤ 1, it follows from the fact that P represents I on pI ¡1 p1qq c that, for every pp, 1, 0q P and a I ¡1 p1q, p ¤a 1. Hence Ipaq min pp,ā,bqP pā.pq¤a b for all a B.
Define α : ∆ Ñ ¡0 ¢ by αppq tpa, bq ¡0 ¢ | pp, a, bq Pu. By the definition of P, the properties of Φ (in particular non-emptiness, closure, convexity, the fact about null states) and the continuity of the superdifferential mapping, α is non-trivial, null-consistent, closed and convex. By the last two properties of P mentioned above, α is calibrated (with respect to υ) and grounded. So α is a non-trivial, null-consistent, grounded, calibrated, closed, convex function representing © along with υ according to (5), as required.
Since no proper closed convex subset of Φ represents I in the specified way, there is no closed, convex α I : ∆ Ñ ¡0 ¢ with α I ppq αppq for all p ∆ where the inclusion is proper for at least one p ∆ that represents © along with υ according to (5). It follows from this and Lemma A.1 that the pair pυ, αq is tight.
Now consider the (ii) to (i) implication. It is standard for the Basic Axioms: Weak Order is immediate, Non-degeneracy follows from the non-triviality of υ and α and Continuity follows from the continuity of V . State Consistency follows immediately from the form of the representation, and the fact that α is null-consistent. By the null-consistency of α, for every non-null state s S, x, y X and h A, x s h © y s h if and only if min uυpsq upxq ¥ min uυpsq upyq. Since υ is h, h-precise, it follows that, for every non-null s S, hpsq s phpsqq β phpsqq s hpsq for all β p0, 1q and hpsq¨s x¨s hpsq for all x X. Hence h, h are ©-best-and-worst acts. Since υ is h, h-constant and h, h-precise, for each β r0, 1s, V ph β hq βV phq p1 ¡ βqV phq; and hence, by the representation, f © h β h iff a°s S ppsqu s pfpsqq b ¥ βV phq p1¡βqV phq for all p ∆, pa, bq αppq and u s υpsq.
Strong Uncertainty Aversion with respect to h, h follows immediately from the form of the representation.
Finally, consider the uniqueness clause, and suppose that pυ, αq, and pυ I , α I q are tight pairs of state-dependent multi-utilities and ambiguity indices representing ©. Let V υ,α and V υ I ,α I be the functionals defined from them according to (5). By Lemma A.3 below, we can assume without loss of generality that υ and υ I are calibrated and constant with respect to the same h, h. Let κ ¡0 and λ be such that κV υ I ,α Iphq λ V υ,α phq and κV υ I ,α Iphq λ V υ,α phq (it is straightforward to show that such κ and λ exist). Define V P κV υ I ,α I λ, υ P κυ I λ and α P by α P ppq tpa, κb λp1 ¡ aqq | dpa, bq α I ppqu for all p ∆; it is clear that V P , υ P and α P are related according to (5) and that V P represents ©. υ P is h, h-precise and h, h-constant since pυ I , α I q is, and because υ is h, h-precise and h, h-constant, V P ph α hq V ph α hq for all α r0, 1s. It follows by the fact that for each f A there exists an unique α r0, 1s with f h α h and the fact that they both represent © that V P V . Since υ and υ P are h, h-constant, it follows that, for all s, t S, and β r0, 1s, V s phpsq β hpsqq V t phpsq β hpsqq V ph β hq V P ph β hq V P t phpsq β hpsqq V P s phpsq β hpsqq, where V s pxq min uυpsq u ¤ x and similarly for V P s . Since, for each nonnull s S and x X, there exists a unique β with x s hpsq β hpsq, it follows that V P s V s for each non-null s S. Since υpsq is tight, by the reasoning in the proof of Lemma A.1, it is the convex closure of the set of supergradients of V s ; however, since υ P psq is tight, the same holds for it, and so the two sets are identical. So υpsq υ P psq κυ I psq λ for all non-null s S as required.
Let K V pXq V P pXq; since υ and υ P are h, h-constant, K tmin uυpsq u ¤ x | x Xu tmin uυ P psq u ¤ x | x Xu for all non-null s S. Let I be the functional on K S defined from V as in the proof of Theorem 2, and similarly for I P and V P . Since V V P , I I P . By the construction in the proof of Theorem 2, since α is tight, it is generated by the set of supergradients of I; however, since α P is tight, the same holds for it, so α α P . So α tpa, κb λp1 ¡ aqq | dpa, bq α I ppqu for all p ∆, as required. Lemma A.3. Let pυ, αq and pυ I , α I q be pairs of h, h-(respectively h I , h I -)state dependent multi-utilities and ambiguity indices representing © according to (5). Then h α h h I α h I for all α r0, 1s. It follows in particular that υ and υ I are both h, h-constant, h, h-precise Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) ), it follows from EC-Independence that I is positive homogeneous (Ipλcq λIpcq for all c V pAq S , λ ¡0 ) and constant additive (Ipc r ¦ q Ipcq r, where r ¦ is the constant function taking value r everywhere). Consider any p, a, b with pa, bq αppq such that ap b is the unique support to I at some c ripV pAq It follows, taking ¡ 0, that a ¥ 1; however, taking the case of 0 implies that a ¤ 1. So a 1. Similarly, considering λc for λ ¡ 0, λ $ 1 such that λc V pAq S , we have Ipλcq ¤ ap ¤ pλcq b λpap ¤ c bq p1 ¡ λqb λIpcq p1 ¡ λqb. Positive homogeneity implies that Ipλcq λIpcq. Again, taking λ 1 implies that b ¥ 0 whereas the case with λ ¡ 1 implies that b ¤ 0; so b 0. It thus follows that at all points where I has a unique support, a 1 and b 0 for the supporting ap b. It follows from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2, and in particular the fact that α is determined by the closure of such points, that a 1 and b 0 for every pa, bq and p ∆ such that pa, bq αppq. By the closure and convexity of α, it reduces to a closed convex set C ∆, yielding representation (1). Since α is null-consistent, for every p, q C and s S, if ppsq 0 and qpsq $ 0, then for all r intpνpXqq S , Iprq °s S ppsqr s , whence, by the constant additivity and positive homogeneity of I, this holds for all r νpXq S , contradicting the fact that p C non-null s S. Take any such V s . Since © s © s I for all non-null s, s I S, V s represents © s I. Moreover, for similar reasons, it represents the restriction of © to X. Note that since V s is linear on thpsq β hpsq | β r0, 1su, with hpsq and hpsq maximal and minimal elements of © s I respectively, it is a minimal concave representation of © s I, in the sense of Debreu (1976) (see also Kannai (1977) ): every other concave representation V I of © s I with V I pXq V pXq is such that V I pxq ¥ V pxq for all x X. Since the same holds for V s I, and since minimal representations are unique (Kannai, 1977, pp11-13) , it follows that V s V s I, and more generally that V s V t for every non-null s, t S. In particular, it follows that, for every non-null s, s I S, hpsq β hpsq s hps I q β hps I q for all β r0, 1s. Since υ in representation (5) can be taken to be h, h-constant and tight, it follows that υpsq υptq for all non-null s, t S. Setting υptq U υpsq for all t S and any non-null s S yields the desired representation.
Lemma A.5. Let © be a preference relation satisfying the axioms in Theorem 2. © satisfies State-wise Independence if and only if it can be represented according to (5) with singletonvalued υ (i.e. υpsq is a singleton, for all s S).
Proof. The necessity of the axiom is straightforward. As concerns sufficiency, by Statewise Independence, © s satisfies the standard Independence axiom for each state s S. It follows by standard arguments that the V s defined in the proof of Theorem 2 is affine for every s S, so υpsq, being tight, is a singleton for all non-null s S. υpsq can thus be taken as a singleton for all s S (for instance, by setting υ on null states as in the proof of Theorem 2).
Lemma A.6. Let © be a preference relation satisfying the axioms in Theorem 2. © satisfies Restricted Independence with respect to ©-best-and-worst h, h if and only if it can be represented according to (5) with singleton C.
Proof. The necessity of the axiom is straightforward. Their sufficiency is a direct extension of the proof of Theorem 1, noting that Restricted Independence implies that I is affine, and hence, by standard arguments, is generated by a (single) probability measure p. ¤ ¤ ¤ y (with indifferences for null states), contradicting the fact that x © y. So, for f, g A satisfying the conditions in the Monotonicity axiom, f © g s 1 f © g ts 1 ,s 2 u f © ¤ ¤ ¤ © g, where each step is an application of the previous fact;
hence State Independence implies Monotonicity in the presence of Weak Order.
The other direction was established by the reasoning at the beginning of the proof of Lemma A.4.
A.4 Proofs of Results in Section 5
Proposition 4 follows directly from Proposition 8 (and the proof of Theorem 1). 
